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This policy brief discusses new evidence in the 
economics profession showing that capital controls 
are important macro-prudential measures that 
nations should have in their toolkit to prevent and 
mitigate financial crises. United States trade and 
investment treaties do not reflect this emerging 
consensus on capital controls. It is  essential to 
rectify this problem as the United States finalizes 
its new moves forward on negotiations for a Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and a bi-
lateral investment treaty (BIT) with China.  
New Research on Capital Controls and Financial 
Stability
Cross-border capital flows can help 
developing countries grow. Indeed, many 
developing countries may lack the savings or 
financial institutions that can help finance business 
activity. Capital from abroad can fill that gap.  
Therefore, under normal circumstances, the more 
capital flowing into a developing country, the more 
the country benefits. However, certain types of 
capital flows are more stable than others.  Foreign 
direct investment (FDI)—firms that establish a 
physical presence in another country—is seen as 
much more stable than currency, stock and bond, 
and derivative trading.  Moreover, non-FDI cross-
border capital flows tend to be “pro-cyclical”: too 
much money comes in when times are good, and 
too much money evaporates during a downturn.
A key characteristic of the global financial crisis 
has been the mass swings of capital flows across 
the globe. Indeed, international investment 
positions now surpass global output. Developing 
and emerging markets are no strangers to these 
flows. When the crisis hit, capital rapidly left the 
developing world in a flight to the “safety” of the 
United States market. In the attempt to recover, 
many industrialized nations, including the U.S., 
have resorted to loose monetary policy with 
characteristically low interest rates. Relatively 
higher interest rates and a stronger recovery have 
triggered yet another surge in capital flows to the 
developing world. The result was an increasing 
concern over currency appreciation, asset bubbles, 
and even inflation.  As active US monetary policy 
has tapered off, there has been a decelaration in 
capital flows to emerging markets, followed by 
currency depreciation and rising debt burdens.
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Under these circumstances, capital controls can 
help smooth the inflows and outflows of capital and 
protect developing economies. Most controls target 
highly short-term capital flows, usually conducted 
for speculative purposes.
For example, Colombia’s 2007 capital controls 
required foreign investors to park a percentage of 
their investment in the central bank, which helped 
that nation escape some of the damage from the 
global financial crisis (Coelho and Gallagher, 2013).  
Chile and Malaysia, two nations that form part of the 
TPP negotiations, successfully used capital controls 
in the 1990s to avoid the worst of the damages 
during crises in that decade (Magud et al, 2006).
In the wake of the financial crisis, nations such as 
Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand 
have all used capital controls to stem the massive 
inflows of speculative investment entering their 
economies and wreaking havoc on their exchange 
rates and asset markets (Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). 
South Korea, where the won has appreciated by 30% 
since 2008, has direct limits on foreign exchange 
speculation, for example, and has also levied an 
outflows tax on capital gains of foreign purchases of 
government bonds.
A pathbreaking IMF study finds that capital controls 
like these have helped developing nations stem 
currency appreciation and asset bubbles in the 
past (Ostry et al, 2010).  Moreover, the IMF study 
found that capital controls helped buffer some 
of the worst effects of the financial crisis in some 
developing countries. In lieu of these findings, the 
IMF now endorses the use of capital controls as 
a part of the macroeconomic policy toolkit. The 
IMF (2009) permitted capital controls on outflows 
in Iceland, Ukraine and Latvia as the crisis hit, 
and recommended that countries such as Brazil, 
Colombia, and India use controls on inflows to tame 
the mass influx of capital that herded to emerging 
markets in 2009-2010.  New studies by the Federal 
Reserve and Columbia University show that the 
myriad uses of capital controls in the wake of the 
crisis met their stated goals (Ahmed and Zlate, 2013; 
Erten and Ocampo, 2013).
Capital Controls and U.S. Treaties
In contrast with the treaties of many other 
industrialized nations however, the template 
for United States trade and investment treaties 
does not leave adequate flexibility for nations to 
use regulate capital flows to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises. At their core, U.S. treaties see 
restrictions on the movement of speculative capital 
as a violation of their terms. The safeguards in U.S. 
treaties were not intended to cover the regulation of 
capital flows (Gallagher, 2011; Gallagher and Stanley 
2012, 2103).
This shortcoming in U.S. treaties has recently been 
the subject of significant controversy. In January 
of 2011, 250 economists from the United States 
and across the globe, including a Nobel Laureate, 
former IMF officials, two former ministers of finance, 
and members of pro-trade think tanks such as the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics 
sent a letter to the U.S. government calling on the 
U.S. to address this imbalance in U.S. trade treaties 
(GDAE, 2011).  That letter was followed by a rebuttal 
letter signed by many of the major corporate lobby 
organization in the United States and has since 
become elevated as an important issue in pending 
treaties and negotiations (USCIB, 2011).
U.S. trade and investment treaties explicitly deem 
capital controls as actionable measures that 
can trigger investor-state claims. The Transfers 
provisions in the investment chapters of trade 
treaties, or in stand alone BITS, require that capital 
be allowed to flow between trading partners 
“freely and without delay”. This is reinforced in 
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“ At their core, U.S. treaties see 
restrictions on the movement 
of speculative capital as a 
violation of their terms. The 
safeguards in U.S. treaties 
were not intended to cover the 
regulation of capital flows.”
trade treaties’ chapters on financial services that 
often state that nations are not permitted to pose 
“limitations on the total value of transactions or 
assets in the form of numerical quotas” across 
borders.
In the financial services chapters of U.S. trade 
treaties, and in U.S. BITS, there is usually a section 
on “exceptions.” One exception, informally referred 
to as the “prudential exception,” usually has 
language similar to the following from the US-Peru 
trade treaty:
Capital account regulations are not seen as 
permissible under this exception. This has 
been communicated by the United States Trade 
Representative and in 2003 testimony by the Under 
Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs to 
the U.S. Congress (Taylor, 2003).  In general this 
is because the term “prudential reasons” usually 
interpreted in a much narrower fashion, pertaining 
to individual financial institutions.  Concern has 
also been expressed that the last sentence is “self-
canceling,” making many measures not permissible
The prudential exception in services chapters 
or BITs is usually followed by an exception for 
monetary policy that often reads like (again to use 
the US-Peru Trade treaty):
This second exception could be seen as granting 
nations the flexibility to pursue necessary monetary 
and exchange rate policy (of which capital controls 
are a part). Yet the last sentence in that paragraph 
specifically excludes transfers.
These provisions were very controversial with the 
US-Chile and US-Singapore trade treaties in the 
early 2000s. U.S. trading partners repeatedly asked 
for a safeguard that would include capital controls 
but the United States has denied that request. In 
a few instances, U.S. negotiators granted special 
annexes that allowed U.S. trading partners to receive 
an extended grace period before investor-state 
claims can be filed with respect to capital controls, 
as well as limits on damages related to certain types 
of controls.
These annexes are still inadequate in the wake of 
the financial crisis for at least four reasons. First, the 
annexes still allow for investor-state claims related 
to capital controls—they just require investors to 
delay the claims for compensation. An investor has 
to wait one year to file a claim related to capital 
controls to prevent and mitigate crises, but that 
claim can be for a measure taken during the cooling 
off year.  The prospect of such investor-state cases 
could discourage the use of controls that may 
be beneficial to financial stability. Second, many 
other nations’ treaties allow for capital controls. 
Indeed, theCanada-Chile FTA, the EU-Korea FTA, 
the Japan-Peru BIT, and the Japan-Korea BIT 
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1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter or Chapter Ten (Investment),
J   Fourteen (Telecommunications), or Fifteen (Electronic Commerce), including specifically Articles 14.16 
(Relationship to Other Chapters) and 11.1 (Scope and Coverage) with respect to the supply of financial services 
in the territory of a Party by a covered investment, a Party shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining 
measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or 
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial service supplier, 
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.  Where such measures do not conform with the 
provisions of this Agreement referred to in this paragraph, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Party’s commitments or obligations under such provisions.
2. Nothing in this Chapter or Chapter Ten (Investment), Fourteen (Telecommunictions) or 
J Fifteen (Electronic-Commerce), including specifically Articles 14.16 (Relationship to Other Chapters) and 
11.1 (Scope and Coverage) with respect to the supply of financial services in the territory of a Party by a covered 
investment, applies to non-discriminatory measures of general application taken by any public entity in pursuit of 
monetary and related credit or exchange rate policies.  This paragraph shall not affect a Party’s obligations under 
Article 10.9 (Performance Requirements) with respect to measures covered by Chapter Ten (Investment) or under 
Article 10.8 (Transfers) or 11.10 (Transfers and Payments).
Financial Services chapter: Article 12.10:  Exceptions
( just to name a few) all grant greater flexibility for 
capital controls (Anderson, 2011, Viterbo, 2011).
This gives incentives for nations to apply controls 
in a discriminatory manner (applying controls on 
EU investors but not on US investors).  Third, the 
IMF has expressed concerns that restrictions on 
capital controls in U.S. agreements, even those with 
the special annexes, may conflict with the IMF’s 
authority to recommend capital controls in certain 
country programs, as they have done in Iceland and 
several other countries. Finally, the special dispute 
settlement procedure included in the US-Chile and 
Singapore FTAs did not become a standard feature 
of U.S. agreements.  It is not in CAFTA, any U.S. BIT, 
or the pending US-Korea FTA.
New IMF Rules on Capital Controls 
The IMF has now issued rules that run up 
against US trade and investment treaties 
with respect to capital controls.  On December 
3, 2012 the IMF made public an Executive-Board 
approved “institutional view” on capital account 
liberalization and the management of capital flows. 
In a nutshell, the IMF’s new ‘institutional view” is 
that nations should eventually and sequentially 
open their capital account.  (IMF, 2012b).  This is 
indeed in contrast with its view in the 1990s that 
all nations should be uniformly required to open 
their capital accounts regardless of the strength of 
a nation’s institutions.  The IMF now recognizes 
that capital flows also bring risk, particularly in 
the form of capital inflow surges and sudden stops 
that can cause a great deal of financial instability.  
Under such conditions, and under a narrow set of 
circumstances, according to the new ‘institutional 
view’ the IMF may recommend the use of capital 
controls to prevent or mitigate such instability in 
official country consultations or Article IV reports.  
In other words, the IMF now sanctions staff and 
management to recommend the use of capital 
controls to nations under certain circumstances. 
And under a very narrow set of circumstances 
a nation may receive recommendations to 
discriminate capital flows based on residency.
The IMF is aware of the fact that they may 
recommend capital controls to nations that do not 
have the policy space to deploy such instruments 
because they would be deemed actionable under a 
trade agreement or investment treaty.  In the final 
report the IMF states:
“As noted, the Fund’s proposed institutional view 
would not (and legally could not) alter members’ 
rights and obligations under other international 
agreements. Rather, conformity with obligations 
under other agreements would continue to be 
determined solely by the existing provisions of 
those agreements. Thus, for example, even where 
the proposed Fund institutional view recognizes 
the use of inflow or outflow CFMs as an appropriate 
policy response, these measures could still violate 
a member‘s obligations under other international 
agreements if those agreements do not have 
temporary safeguard provisions compatible with the 
Fund‘s approach (IMF, 2012b, 42).”
This echoes what the IMF stated in a board report 
earlier this year:
“The limited flexibility afforded by some bilateral 
and regional agreements in respect to liberalization 
obligations may create challenges for the 
management of capital flows. These challenges 
should be weighed against the agreements’ potential 
benefits. In particular, such agreements could be 
a step toward broader liberalization. However, 
these agreements in many cases do not provide 
appropriate safeguards or proper sequencing of 
liberalization, and could thus benefit from reform to 
include these protections (IMF 2012a, 8).”
Indeed, the IMF suggests that the new IMF 
institutional view could help guide future trade 
“ The limited flexibility afforded by some bilateral 
and regional agreements in respect to liberalization 
obligations may create challenges for the management of 
capital flows,” says the IMF.
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treaties and that the IMF could serve as a forum for 
such discussions.
“In particular, the proposed institutional view 
could help foster a more consistent approach 
to the design of policy space for CFMs under 
bilateral and regional agreements. Recognizing the 
macroeconomic, IMS, and global stability goals that 
underpin the institutional view, members drafting 
such agreements in the future, as well as the various 
international bodies that promote these agreements, 
could take into account this view in designing 
the circumstances under which both inflows and 
outflows CFMs may be imposed within the scope of 
their agreements. Similarly—and depending on the 
stages of development of the relevant signatories—
the sequenced approach to liberalization under the 
integrated approach could be taken into account 
to guide the pace and sequencing of liberalization 
obligations, and the re-imposition of CFMs due to 
institutional considerations (IMF, 2012b, 33).”
Reforming U.S. Treaties for Financial Stability
This problem should be rectified. It is in the 
interests of the U.S. and its trading partners to 
have adequate policy space to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises. A number of (non-exclusive) options 
are possible. First, some IMF officials have gone so 
far as to recommend that speculative capitals in the 
form of derivatives and other financial “innovations” 
be omitted from the definition of investment in 
treaties (Hagan, 2000). Another option, more 
recently advocated by the IMF, is to come up with 
a uniform safeguard language that can be used 
by all nations (IMF, 2010, Gallagher and Stanley, 
2013). Finally, and more specific to U.S. treaties, 
the “exceptions” language in U.S. treaties could be 
broadened to explicitly allow for the flexibility to 
deploy controls and other measures now recognized 
as prudential to prevent or mitigate a crisis.
The “prudential exception paragraph” could have a 
footnote with an explicitly non-exhaustive list that 
clarifies that prudential measures include capital 
controls, among other measures. The last sentence 
in that paragraph could be deleted (as it is in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement), as could 
the omission of “transfers” from last sentence in the 
“monetary policy” exception also quoted above.
The global financial crisis has made it all to obvious 
that granting our trading partners the flexibility 
to use legitimate policies to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises is also good for the United States. 
When its trading partners fall into financial 
crisis, the United States loses export markets and 
subsequently jobs in the export sector. Capital 
controls can help stabilize exchange rates, which is 
good for long-term investors and for exporters and 
importers from the United States. When countries 
abroad cannot control financial bubbles that drive 
up currency values, American consumers may be 
hurt by rising prices on imported goods. As we 
have learned all too well, financial instability in a 
globalized world can be contagious, and quickly 
come back to the United States. I
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